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Comment  Loretta J. Mester
Reint Gropp and Anil Kashyap provide a new measure for assessing the 
degree of integration of European banking markets—in particular, retail 
banking markets. The role of integration and the best way to assess the cur-
rent state of integration is a particularly relevant question given the ten- year 
anniversary of the introduction of the euro in 1999 and the current turmoil 
taking place in ﬁ  nancial markets in which banks play a central role. They 
have produced a thought-  provoking chapter that advances the literature.
I will structure my remarks by ﬁ  rst discussing the proposed measure in the 
chapter and then talking about integration more broadly.
Europe has been working toward integrating ﬁ  nancial markets for some 
time. Dermine (2005) reviews some of the major legislative steps toward 
integration. These include the European Commission White Paper on the 
Completion of the Internal Market, published in 1985, which called for a 
single banking license; the Second Banking Directive, 1989, which allowed 
for cross- border bank branching; the Maastricht Treaty on European Union, 
1992; the Directive on Deposit Guarantee Schemes adopted in 1994; the 
creation of a single currency, the euro, in 1999; and the Financial Services 
Action Plan of 1999, which laid out a number of initiatives to promote 
integration of banking and capital markets by 2005.
Before we can assess the beneﬁ  ts of the Gropp and Kashyap measure of 
integration over others in the literature, we need a deﬁ  nition of integration 
and a sense of what beneﬁ  ts integration is expected to provide to the econ-
omy. According to the European Central Bank (ECB), the aim of ﬁ  nancial 
integration in Europe is to increase the eﬃciency of the ﬁ  nancial system, 
increase the eﬀectiveness of the monetary policy transmission mechanism, 
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increase ﬁ  nancial stability, and increase economic development, to the 
extent that the ﬁ  nancial system plays an important role in furthering eco-
nomic development. Increased integration is expected to lead to increased 
competition, which leads to a lower cost of production and better allocation 
of savings toward investment.
Gropp and Kashyap (2009) start with the ECB’s deﬁ  nition of ﬁ  nancial 
integration. According to the ECB, a ﬁ  nancial market is integrated if all 
potential market participants are subject to a single set of rules when dealing 
in the ﬁ  nancial instrument or service, have equal access to the instrument or 
service, and are treated equally when operating in the market. The authors 
add to this deﬁ  nition the idea of eﬃciency, which is gained if markets are 
contestable and the market for corporate control is well-  functioning.
In designing measures of integration it would be useful if the measures 
gave some indication of where integration failure has occurred and point 
policymakers toward actions to remedy impediments. Gropp and Kashyap 
provide some evidence on this. Much of the focus to date has been on inte-
grating settlement and clearing systems. In my view, more emphasis should 
be focused on harmonizing regulatory structures. In particular, the recent 
events in banking markets suggest that retail markets are integrated enough 
for deposits to ﬂ  ow to markets with higher safety net protections. Harmo-
nizing the supervisory and regulatory structures, deposit insurance systems, 
procedures for resolving banking failures, and procedures followed in the 
midst of ﬁ  nancial crises would seem to be an important place to focus atten-
tion. This is consistent with the ECB’s deﬁ  nition of operating with a single 
set of rules and being treated equally when operating in the market.
It would also be useful if the measures of integration could inform us 
about what we can expect from integration. Has ﬁ  nancial integration been 
oversold? Are the gains to integration unbounded? Does integration create 
some costs that have to be weighed against the beneﬁ  ts of integration? Mak-
ing cross-  border transactions more eﬃcient is a beneﬁ  t, as more economic 
activity occurs across borders, but such eﬃciency also carries a cost in un-
stable times, especially if the regulatory structures across borders are not 
harmonized. Can we develop measures that relate integration to the net 
beneﬁ  ts?
The literature on integration has mainly focused on three other types of 
metrics: (a) cross-  border retail operations of banks—ﬂ  ow measures; (b) 
cross- border bank mergers; and (c) retail interest rate convergence. The ECB 
has developed a number of metrics for assessing the degree of integration 
across several market segments of the ﬁ  nancial system, including money, 
bond, equity, and banking markets. These metrics are available in the ECB’s 
report on Financial Integration in Europe (the ﬁ  rst report was published 
in March 2007 and the second in April 2008). The conclusion of the latest 
report is that the degree of integration varies across market segments. The 
money market is highly integrated, helped by integration of the high-  value 248        Reint Gropp and Anil K Kashyap
payment systems across countries and the recent introduction of the TAR-
GET2 system for wholesales payments. Government and corporate bond 
markets, and even equity markets, have a considerable degree of integra-
tion, aided by the development of securities clearing and settlement systems. 
Wholesale banking markets have become more integrated; retail banking 
markets in Europe remain fragmented.
The ECB (2008) report provides indicators on retail banking in three cat-
egories: (a) cross-  border presence indicators like dispersion in the number 
of bank branches and subsidiaries and volume of assets across euro area 
countries, and number and value of cross-  border M&As; (b) price-  based 
indicators like convergence of retail interest rates; and (c) quantity-  based 
indicators like diversiﬁ  cation of deposit and loan amounts across countries. 
According to the ECB report, from 2001 to 2007, the median share of bank-
ing assets of foreign subsidiaries increased from 8.8 percent to 14.4 percent 
of total banking assets, but the median share of assets of foreign branches 
decreased slightly over time to about 2.0 percent in 2007. Thus, most of the 
assets of the euro area banks in other euro area countries are still held in 
subsidiaries rather than in branches. The number of cross- border M&As has 
been less than the number of within- country M&As in the banking industry, 
but there has been an increase in euro area cross-  border M&A transactions 
in terms of value since 2003. The dispersion of interest rates on loans to 
households for consumption purposes has remained relatively high and has 
tended to increase in recent years.
Gropp and Kashyap (2008) critique the interest rate metrics used in the 
literature, arguing that these are inappropriate measures because there is so 
much heterogeneity in demand in retail banking products across markets. 
Unless this heterogeneity is adequately controlled for, one should not expect 
the prices of retail products to be the same across markets. They argue that 
the law of one price does not hold because of this heterogeneity. But an 
alternative view is that if we adequately deﬁ  ned the product, the law of one 
price holds, but it holds for the individual products’ characteristics (hedonic 
pricing), and so the convergence test is diﬃcult to implement. Presumably 
the heterogeneity they are thinking about is fundamental—for example, 
diﬀerences in search costs, which mean that even within a single market we 
would not expect a single price—and not due to diﬀerent regulatory condi-
tions or rules across countries. If price diﬀerences are due to diﬀerent rules 
under which ﬁ  nancial systems operate across countries, we would not want 
to forgive such diﬀerences in assessing the degree of integration—that is, 
they would be an indicator of a lack of integration.
Instead of focusing on price, Gropp and Kashyap focus on bank prof-
itability—they measure the degree of convergence of bank proﬁ  t levels to 
the average proﬁ  t level across countries. This is perhaps easier to imple-
ment, since it assumes banks choose their product characteristics appro-
priately to maximize proﬁ  ts. Their metric gets at the idea of eﬃciency, one A New Metric for Banking Integration in Europe    2 4 9
of the goals of integration. In particular, they relate integration to level of 
entry and exit barriers; that is, to contestability. The logic of the Gropp and 
Kashyap measure is straightforward: With low barriers to entry and a well- 
functioning market for corporate control (which implies low barriers to 
exit), high-  cost banks (and therefore low-  proﬁ  t banks) would be driven out 
of the market, and banks would not be able to exert any market power over 
pricing. Thus, bank proﬁ  tability would converge across banks as integration 
increases. To the extent that there is proﬁ  t dispersion, it means there are 
barriers to entry and/  or exit—and hence, almost by deﬁ  nition, low levels 
of integration.
The authors look for convergence by estimating a partial adjustment 
equation of the form:
ROAit    ROAt ∗  	ROAit1  wit,
where ROA is the book value of return on assets and ROA∗ is long- run equi-
librium proﬁ  t. They deﬁ  ne strong integration if there is a common ROA∗ to 
which the proﬁ  t rates of all banks in the world converge and weak integra-
tion if there is a common ROA∗ to which the proﬁ  t rates of all European 
Union banks converge. The equation is estimated for several diﬀerent groups 
of banks separately: listed banks, unlisted banks, savings and cooperative 
banks, U.S. banks, EU banks, banks with ROA 
 ROA∗, and banks with 
ROA  ROA∗. These latter two groups can give us some information on 
whether competitive forces are at work—are returns to high-  proﬁ  t banks 
being competed away—and whether the market for corporate control is 
working—are ineﬃcient banks being driven from the market? The ROA∗ 
is proxied by the average ROA for the group of banks investigated. Inte-
gration is measured by the coeﬃcient . As  approaches 1, adjustment is 
instantaneous; as  decreases, adjustment is slower.
The authors ﬁ  nd that there is high convergence in the United States, lim-
ited retail bank integration in Europe for listed banks but none for unlisted 
banks or savings and cooperative banks, competitive forces at work but not 
corporate control at work for unlisted U.S. banks, and neither competitive 
forces nor corporate control at work for unlisted European banks. (The 
authors obtain qualitatively similar results when they perform a robustness 
test using book-  value return on equity as the measure of proﬁ  tability.)
I think the authors’ test, with its focus on proﬁ  tability, is a good alternative 
to those in the literature, but it also has some implementation diﬃculties. In 
particular, I believe the deﬁ  nition of proﬁ  tability used in the implementa-
tion has several drawbacks. First, it is a book- value measure of proﬁ  ts. They 
give two reasons for using book values. First, the number of listed banks 
for which market values are available in Europe is low. Second, they say that 
eﬃciency in stock market valuations would be misleading about integration. 
I do not understand that argument. Consider two banks that operate in 
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markets. If one bank were more eﬃcient than the other, investors would bid 
up the stock market value of the eﬃcient bank. That is, the market values 
would diverge even though the stock market is eﬃcient. Presumably the 
stock market valuations would not converge if there were diﬀerences in the 
proﬁ  tabilities of the banks regardless of the eﬃciency of the stock market. 
It seems preferable to use the measure most reﬂ  ective of bank proﬁ  ts, and 
that would seem to be market value.
Another problem with the book-  value measure is that it also ignores 
risk-  taking. At its heart, banking is about handling risk, and the amount 
of risk to take on is a choice of bank management. Banks’ comparative 
advantage follows from their unique capital structure—they obtain private 
information from deposit histories, which is useful in monitoring loan risk 
(Mester, Nakamura, and Renault 2007). Banks are able to pool deposits 
and loans to reduce liquidity risk and credit risk by diversiﬁ  cation. Their 
capital structure, which includes demandable deposits, and its role in the 
payments system means banks are subject to regulation. Banks wanting to 
limit the costs of ﬁ  nancial distress might limit risk- taking, while banks want-
ing to exploit the safety net might increase risk-  taking. The risk choice is 
endogenous and risk- taking inﬂ  uences banks’ production decisions, includ-
ing the mix of assets they choose, asset quality, oﬀ- balance- sheet  activities 
(some of which are used for hedging), capital structure, debt maturity, and 
resources allocated to risk management. All of these decisions aﬀect cost 
and proﬁ  tability (see Hughes, Mester, and Moon 2001; Hughes et al. 1999). 
If bank managers care about risk, they may trade oﬀ higher expected proﬁ  t 
for lower risk when producing banking services, but they may also care 
about higher moments of the distribution of proﬁ  ts (e.g., proﬁ  t volatility). 
Lower proﬁ  t-  lower risk production plans may result in higher value than 
higher proﬁ  t-  higher risk production plans—discounted present value de-
pends on risk through the discount rate applied to proﬁ  ts and high risk 
might lead to ﬁ  nancial distress, which imposes costs. Bank managers choose 
production plans that maximize their utility; these plans imply a subjective 
probability distribution of proﬁ  ts. Each production plan is linked to a sub-
jective, conditional probability distribution of proﬁ  t by the managers’ beliefs 
about the probability distribution of future economic states and about how 
these states interact with production plans to generate proﬁ  t. Given these 
beliefs, a bank’s choice of production plan is equivalent to a choice of a 
conditional probability distribution of proﬁ  t. If there are no agency prob-
lems, then bank managers choose the production plan that maximizes the 
market value of the ﬁ  rm.
It seems to me that to assess integration we need to account for risk- taking 
on the part of the banks. We would want to look at convergence in market 
values of banks for those that are traded and risk-  adjusted proﬁ  ts for those 
that are unlisted. For example, if we saw two banks operating with the same A New Metric for Banking Integration in Europe    2 5 1
level of proﬁ  ts, but one chose an ex-  ante riskier portfolio than the other, 
would we want to conclude there was integration? These banks would be 
operating on very diﬀerent points on the risk-  expected return frontier. To 
the extent that we are interested in diﬀerences in eﬃciency across banks, we 
might think about using direct measures of proﬁ  t and cost eﬃciency rather 
than proﬁ  t levels. This might be preferable, since it might point us toward 
where failures of integration are coming from—is it the cost side or the 
revenue side?
Let me ﬁ  nish my remarks by discussing whether we are asking too much 
from integration. Europe has been working toward integration for a long 
time. Integration beneﬁ  ts can happen only if integration leads to increased 
competition in the ﬁ  nancial services industry. From the metrics in the litera-
ture and in this chapter we can tell whether integration is increasing, but we 
do not get a sense of what is achievable—how far can integration go? There 
are some reasons to be cautious here. First, there is some debate in the lit-
erature about whether retail banking markets are contestable or not. Xavier 
Vives (1991) argues that retail banking markets may not meet the criteria for 
contestability because of barriers to entry, including branch networks and 
economies of scale and switching costs. It could be that one of the reasons 
integration has been slower in the retail banking markets than in other ﬁ  nan-
cial services segments is due to these higher barriers to entry.
Second, despite the lower barriers to entry across U.S. banking markets, 
there appear to be continuing diﬀerences in eﬃciency across banks. Thus, 
expectations of the gains from integration on the eﬃciency side may be 
exaggerated. Berger and Mester (1997) ﬁ  nd that cost ineﬃciency averages 
about 13 percent and proﬁ  t ineﬃciency averages 50 percent, suggesting large 
diﬀerences in eﬃciency across banks in the United States, and much of the 
diﬀerences are unexplained—twenty- ﬁ  ve explanatory variables explain only 
about 7 percent of the variance of measured cost eﬃciency and about 35 
percent of the variance in measured proﬁ  t eﬃciency.
Third, while integration raises the number of potential competitors 
who can exert discipline, evidence from the bank merger literature raises 
the question of whether bank mergers are value-  enhancing or driven by 
empire building. Corporate control problems in banking can exist because 
the relationship between bank owners (stockholders) and bank managers is 
a principal-  agent relationship, and the ways of controlling the behavior of 
bank managers may not be totally eﬀective. Hughes et al. (2003) ﬁ  nd that 
asset acquisitions are associated with worse performance when banks have 
entrenched management but better performance when management is not 
entrenched.
Fourth, one of the mechanisms for achieving integration is the market for 
corporate control. But recent research shows that there are diﬀerences in the 
notion of a corporation’s purpose across countries; for example, whether 252        Reint Gropp and Anil K Kashyap
it is there for the shareholders or whether it is for all the stakeholders-
  shareholders, employees, bondholders, and customers (see Allen, Carletti, 
and Marquez 2007). These diﬀerences also mean there will be diﬀerences in 
corporate governance structures across countries, which may limit what is 
achievable by integrating banking product markets.
Finally, while integration oﬀers potential eﬃciency gains, the interaction 
between ﬁ  nancial integration and ﬁ  nancial stability is not straightforward. 
More integration could increase ﬁ  nancial stability via diversiﬁ  cation of 
default risk, but it could also increase the possibilities for systemic risk and 
contagion. This potential cost needs to be recognized. Harmonizing the rules 
of engagement across markets would help limit this potential cost—and at 
the same time increase integration. The current ﬁ  nancial crisis underscores 
the importance of participants facing the same rules across markets—one 
of the facets of the ECB deﬁ  nition of integration. But even though a great 
amount of progress has been made on harmonizing the regulatory structures 
across the countries of Europe, some diﬀerences remain. In particular, as we 
have seen, the actions taken in the midst of a crisis diﬀer across the countries, 
especially when, ex-  ante, there has not been a well-  articulated process to 
follow. There can be conﬂ  icts of interest across regulatory bodies that have 
national interests. The ﬁ  nancial crisis has illuminated the diﬀerences in the 
government safety net—deposit insurance and lender-  of-  last-  resort func-
tions—that remain across countries. In the United States, even with har-
monized banking regulation, there are potential conﬂ  icts of interest across 
the multiple supervisory bodies (Oﬃce of the Comptroller of the Currency 
[OCC], Oﬃce of Thrift Supervision [OTS], Federal Reserve, Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation [FDIC]), and there is more separation between regu-
lation of diﬀerent segments of the ﬁ  nancial services industry. In Europe 
there are diﬀerences in where responsibility for the bank supervisory activi-
ties lie—in the central bank or another body. This is probably not important 
in normal economic circumstances, but it might be during ﬁ  nancial crises 
when the ability of the central bank to obtain information from the super-
visory authorities in a timely manner becomes crucially important and the 
credibility the central bank has gained in monetary policy might be transfer-
able to its handling of ﬁ  nancial instability.
I want to thank the authors for their thought-  provoking chapter. I do 
believe their proposed new metric is a contribution to the literature and has 
the potential to be easier to implement and more informative about integra-
tion. I would suggest trying to incorporate risk into the measure. Regarding 
the integration literature more broadly, I would recommend that it bring 
some focus to the potential costs of integration and ways to address those 
costs. This would help calibrate what we should expect to gain from further 
integration. Those further gains may come less from increased eﬃciency and 
more from reductions in systemic risk and increased coordination across 
countries when there is a crisis.A New Metric for Banking Integration in Europe    2 5 3
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